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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

LENORE M. GILL,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.

Case No. 19142

RULAND J. GILL,
Defendant-Respondent.

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an appeal by Plaintiff from a Decree of Divorce
which distributed property and assets in a manner contrary to
Plaintiff's wishes.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
This matter was tried to the Court, Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Decree were perfected and filed and
disposed of the marital assets acquired by the parties during
marriage.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant seeks a modification of the property distribution
as ordered by the trial court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff filed an action for divorce and prayed for
equitable property distribution of marital assets acquired during
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the marriage between herself and defendant.

A stipulated Restrainic.

Order was entered on the records of the court on the 29th of
October, 1979, which contained a clause restraining Defendant from
encumbering or disposing of, in any manner whatsoever, any assets ul
properties of the Utah corporations Gill Tire Market, Inc. or
Fleetway, Inc. without the express prior knowledge and approval of
Plaintiff or without obtaining appropriate court order (R. 21).
At the time of the order, the Defendant was operating Gill's
Tire Market and Fleetway, Inc. and made his living as the operator
of those corporations.

Plaintiff did not participate in the

management of either corporation, and after the Restraining Order
was entered, Defendant continued to operate the businesses and used
the assets of Fleetway, Inc. when it became defunct to operate a
retail tire outlet in the name of Tire City.

None of the businesses

succeeded and, as a consequence, the marital estate being used by
Defendant decreased in value.
At the Plaintiff's request, the divorce action was bifurcate:
and a decree obtained by Plaintiff on the 22nd day of January, 1980
which reserved the issues regarding distribution of parties' marital
assets for further proceeding (R. 41).

At the time of the decree,

Defendant was operating the business subsequently known as Fleetway,
Inc. and Gill's Tire Market.
Extended hearings into the property rights of the parties
commenced on the 22nd of December and were completed on the 28th
of December.

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were then

prepared and, it is Defendant's belief, coverPd all issues raised
at the time of trial.

-3-

Extended hearings into the property rights of the parties
commenced on the 22nd of December and were completed on the 28th
of December.

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were then

prepared and, it is Defendant's belief, covered all issues raised
at the time of trial.
The Plaintiff explored, through her own witnesses and
through cross-examination, the many claims which she had that
the Defendant had wrongfully dissipated assets of the marital
estate and had violated the Restraining Order issued.
The court found that Defendant had operated the businesses
of Gill's Tire Market, Fleetway, Inc., and Tire City, that the
businesses had not prospered, and that there had been no increase
in assets of the parties used by Defendant to operate the
businesses or to maintain himself
The court specifically found

(Finding #11, R. 160).
R. 158) that the

Defendant had not intentionally secreted or hid assets belonging
to the marital estate or attempted to deprive Plaintiff of her
interest in those assets.
Plaintiff, through much of the hearing as shown by the
transcript of testimony, tried to prove the contrary to Finding

#3.
There was no finding that the Defendant had violated the
Restraining Order which was in place during the period from
October, 1979 to December, 1982.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE DISTRIBUTION ORDERED BY THE COURT IS
A PROPER EXERCISE OF JUDICIAL DISCRETION.
POINT II
THE COURT DID NOT FIND THAT DEFENDANT
VIOLATED THE RESTRAINING ORDER.
POINT III
AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES WERE PROPER
EXERCISE OF JUDICIAL DISCRETION.
POINT I
THE DISTRIBUTION ORDERED BY THE COURT IS
A PROPER EXERCISE OF JUDICIAL DISCRETION.
The marital estate of parties to this action consisted of
interest of the parties in going businesses which the Defendant
continued to operate after the divorce complaint was filed, a home
in which the Plaintiff resided, and numerous other miscellaneous
items of personal property.

Many hours of testimony were taken by

the court and no restriction placed on any party to present every
item of evidence available on the issues.
The record is clear that after January, 1980, when Plaintif:
obtained her divorce, constant efforts were made to monitor and
oversee the activities of the Defendant in the operations of the
businesses he was engaged in.
The court decree divided the personal property by
to the Plaintiff and Defendant items that their interests seemed
indicate would be proper for them in building a new life.

Cc

It order,
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that the home of the parties be sold, the obligations relating
to it paid and the balance of the proceeds divided one half to
each of the parties.

There was an order that accounts receivable

from the Fleetway tire business be divided equally.

Defendant

was ordered to pay the business debts and the marital debts
incurred by the parties prior to separation that any proceeds
out of the bankruptcy be divided equally and that the Defendant
pay all the business debts incurred in his business operation of
Tire City.

Defendant was ordered to pay any income tax obligations

owing for the years 1977, 1978 and 1979 while parties lived together.
It is apparent Defendant believes that the court attempted
to equitably divide the property acquired by the parties during
their marriage and to make a 50-50 distribution.

Considering the

complexity of the business operations and the items of personal and
real property, as well as extensive amount of obligations that were
owing, Defendant submits that the court did a masterful and expert
job in fashioning an equitable decree.

The decree certainly

cannot be shown to involve any abuse of discretion.
This court for many years has steadfastly adhered to the
rule that the trial court is permitted considerable discretion in
adjusting the financial and property interest of the parties and
its 3Ctions are entitled to presumption of validity.

Savage v.

Sa•1age, 658 P.2d 1201 (Utah 1983).
In another recent decision by this court, the rule was
Pven more strongly stated and this court held in Gibbon v. Gibbon,
656 P.2d 407 as follows:
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"In order to reverse the trial court's distribution of
property in a divorce action, we must find that it "works
such a manifest injustice or inequity, as to indicate a
clear abuse of discretion " Turner v. Turner, Utah.
P.2d 6 (1982).
In light of the widely divergent theories
and conflicting testimony at trial, we cannot say that
it was an abuse of discretion for the court to resolve
the differences between the parties as it did."
See also, Woodard v. Woodard 656 P.2d 431.
Defendant submits that the division of the property rights
of the parties demonstrates a careful exercise of discretion on the
part of the trial court.

It fashioned a decree equitable and fair.

Allocating to each party the property that would promote the likely·
hood that the individual could resume his or her life and adjust to
the status created by the divorce decree.
POINT II
THE COURT DID NOT FIND THAT DEFENDANT
VIOLATED THE RESTRAINING ORDER.
The Restraining Order stipulated to by parties was entered
on the 29th of October, 1979.

Defendant obtained the dicorce decree

dissolving the marital relation on the 22nd day of January, 1980.
During that period of time, the Fleetway business was being dissolvec
the Gill Tire Market business was not active and was heading for
bankruptcy.

There is no question but what all parties understood

the circumstances and that Defendant was attempting to salvage what
he could from the businesses that were rapidly deteriorating into
insolvency.
It apparently is the position of Plaintiff that the
Restraining Order was intended to prevent Defendant from continuing
the operation of the businesses that he was engaged in or attemptin•
to salvage and re-establish those businesses so that he could earn
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money from his occupation.
The discovery proceedings and deposition of Defendant
reveals knowledge of all parties that Defendant was continuing
his business activities.

Defendant submits that neither party

interpreted the Restraining Order as meaning that the Defendant
could not continue to operate to the best of his ability the
businesses that he was engaged in at the time of the separation
and the filing of the complaint.
Marital assets were sold or divided equally.

Procedes

from horse sales were distributed by Defendant to Plaintiff
demonstrating his interpretation of the Restraining Order.
Plaintiff did not seek any contempt citations prior to the trial
for Defendant's continued efforts to operate his businesses.

It

would appear that the Plaintiff also understood that the Restraining
Order was not intended to prevent Defendant attempting to earn
his living through Gill's Tire Market, Fleetway Tire or even in the
establishment of Tire City.
Trial court did not find that the Defendant violated the
Restraining Order.
The contention by Plaintiff that Defendant had intentionally
secreted or hid assets belonging to the marital estate or attempted
to deprive Plaintiff of her interest in those assets was a main
issue at the trial.

Most of the discovery proceedings were aimed

at that particular contention.

Plaintiff failed in her effort to
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prove this allegation on which she had the burden of proof.

The

court found that Defendant did not intentionally secret or hide
assets belonging to the marital estate or attempt to deprive
Plaintiff of her interest in those assets.

(R 157)

It is understandable that the Plaintiff was disappointed
in Defendant's efforts to establish his retail tire business after
the failure of Gill's Tire Market and Fleetway, Inc.

It is also

obvious that the Defendant was disappointed in these efforts and
that his disappointment was probably greater than Plaintiff's.

But

that is a far cry from the proposition argued before this court in
the brief of the Plaintiff that the business failures were the
result of Defendant's intentional efforts.

It is respectfully

submitted, none of the parties intended the order would stop the
operation by Defendant of any of the businesses or retail tire
activities in which he was engaged.
POINT III
AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES WERE PROPER
EXERCISE OF JL'DICIAL DISCRETION.
The court awarded Plaintiff attorney's fees of the
approximate amount that were incurred by Plaintiff prior to the
divorce on the 22nd of January, 1980 and did not award attorney's
fees for the efforts following the divorce to show intentional
dissipation of marital assets.
The barrage of discovery activity would seem to indicate
a paranoia on the part of Plaintiff and her counsel.

The final

resolution of the matter demonstrates that the suspicions and
fears of the Plaintiff which resulted in the repeated discovery
maneuvers, were unfounded.
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It is Defendant's position in this matter that the present
appeal is an extension of the attitude shown in the trial and the
solidly held belief by Plaintiff that Defendant's business reverses
were not the result of his inability to establish a tire business
such as he had conducted during the years of marriage and out of
which he had supported himself and his family, but that his failures
were due in some way to an intentional effort on his part to dissipate
the marital assets and deprive Plaintitf of her share thereof.
A clear statement of this court's rulings on attorney's
fees is found in Sears v. Riemersma, 655 P.2d 1105.

The language

of the court is as follows:
"The award of attorney's fees is in the sound discretion
of the trial court and will not be overturned in the
absence of a showing of a clear abuse of that discretion.
See Beckstrom v. Beckstrom, Utah, 578 P.Ld 520 (1978);
Turtle Management v. Haggis Management, Utah 645 P.2d
667 (1982).
We find no clear abuse of discretion and
affirm the award of attorney's fees."
It is true that the court did not award the Plaintiff the
attorney's fees that the testimony of her attorney might have been
earned.

The court had before it a similar situation in Savage v.

Savage, 658 P.2d 1201, and the language of the decision there seems
especially appropriate here.

It is as follows:
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"Finally, on the question of attorney's fees, we hold
that there was ample evidence to support the trial
court's award and that there has been no showing of
manifest injustice therein
The fee awarded was
considerably less than that established by testimony
at trial, and the evidence on the parties' relative
ability to pay the amounts in question support the
award.
Absent an abuse of discretion, we will not
second-guess the trial court on this issue where there
is sufficient evidence on the reasonableness of the
fee, the need of the plaintiff and the relative
superiority of the defendant's ability to pay."
In Beckstrom v. Beckstrom 578 P.2d 520, the court had before
it a refusal by the trial to give the attorney's fees requested and
pertinent to the present question, Defendant believes is the court's
language:
"The Laubs further complain of being short-changed by
the trial court awarding it attorney's fees of only $500
as the "reasonable" fee provided for enforcement of the
contract.
Their attorney testified that on the basis of
the work involved the reasonable amount to award as his
attorney's fee would be $800.
Even though that evidence
is undisputed,the trial judge was not necessarily
compelled to accept such self-interested testimony whole
cloth and make such an award;7 and in the absence of
patent error or clear abuse of discretion, §his court
will not disturb his findings and judgment.
7.

Arnold Machinery Company, Inc. Vo
11 Utah 2d 246, 357 Po2d 4960

8.

20 Am.Jur.2d Costs, Sec.

Intrusion Prepakt Inc

78.

The great majority of the hours claimed by Plaintiff were
spent in trying to show intentional misuse of the marital assetso
this Plaintiff failedo
be required to payo

t

For this time Defendant submits he should no·

This time was after the marital status had

disolved and no one benefited from the hours

thus spent

CONCLUSION
The record shows clearly that there was no abuse of discre''
by the trial court

in either the property settlement or attorney's
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fee awards.

No findings of a violation or the Restraining Order

by Defendant was made.

The judgment of the trial court should

be affirmed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED

,
day of October, 1983.
DWIGHT L. KING & A SOCIATES, P.C.

